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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In two separate cases, the State charged Jacob S. Davis with, respectively,
felony failure to notify of change of address for sexual offender registration, and multiple
felony sex offenses against minors.  The jury in the first case found Mr. Davis guilty of
failure to notify of change of address for sexual offender registration.  Later, the jury in
the second case found Mr. Davis guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a child under
sixteen, two counts of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age,
and one count of possession of sexually exploitative materials.
Mr. Davis appealed asserting the district court committed reversible error when it
denied his motion for a mistrial in the second trial, because the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct by violating the district court’s order precluding the
introduction of evidence on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender.  Mr. Davis
also asserted the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence in the
first case, because the district court incorrectly considered certain aggravating factors
when fashioning the sentence.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Davis did not demonstrate that
the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial, and did not demonstrate
an abuse of sentencing discretion in sentencing him for his sex offender registry
violation.  (Resp. Br., pp.4-11.)  This Appellant’s Reply Brief is necessary to address the
State’s arguments.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Davis’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied Mr. Davis’ motion for
a mistrial in the sexual conduct case?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
forty-five years, with twenty years fixed, upon Mr. Davis following his conviction




The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Davis’ Motion For A
Mistrial In The Sexual Conduct Case
Mr. Davis asserts the district court committed reversible error when it denied his
motion for a mistrial in the sexual conduct case.  The State improperly elicited testimony
from Z.B. on Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender.  In doing so, the State
committed prosecutorial misconduct by violating the district court’s order granting
Mr. Davis’ motion in limine precluding the introduction of such evidence.  The State has
not met its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that this prosecutorial
misconduct is harmless. The prosecutorial misconduct’s continuing impact on the trial
indicates that the district court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Davis’
motion for a mistrial. See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571-72 (2007).
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State writes “there is no dispute that the statement
that police investigating [Mr.] Davis interviewed Z.B. ‘[a]bout registered sex offender’
was inadmissible and potentially prejudicial to [Mr.] Davis.”  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  But the
State contends, based on Field and State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601 (1989), that it
is Mr. Davis’ burden to show the district court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial
constituted reversible error, as opposed to the State’s burden to show the district court’s
error was harmless.  (See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)  However, the Idaho Supreme Court
explained after Field and Hedger, “[i]n Idaho, the harmless error test established in
[Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] is now applied to all objected-to error.”
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010); see State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174
(2013) (“[T]he Perry standard applies to all claims of error relating to proceedings in
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criminal cases in the trial courts.”).  Under this standard, “[w]here the defendant meets
his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of
demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional
violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
Even assuming it is Mr. Davis’ burden to show the district court’s denial of the
motion for a mistrial constituted reversible error, Mr. Davis has met that burden.  “An
error is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court is able to declare
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” State v.
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry,
150 Idaho at 227).
Here, as discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App Br., pp.16-19), the revelation of
Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender was highly prejudicial.  Z.B.’s response to
the State’s questioning indicated the police had wanted to ask Z.B. questions about
Mr. Davis being a registered sex offender (see Tr., Vol. 2, p.666, Ls.22-24), and the jury
was likely to infer that Mr. Davis was a registered sex offender.  While the State in the
Respondent’s Brief contends Z.B.’s response was merely “potentially prejudicial” (see
Resp. Br., p.6), the State before the district court conceded the topic was “somewhat
prejudicial.”  (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.667, Ls.21-22.)  Indeed, the disclosure of Mr. Davis’
status as a registered sex offender, where he was on trial for multiple alleged sex
offenses against minors, was highly prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson,
549 F.3d 963, 978 (5th Cir. 2008); People v. Stefanovich, 136 A.D.3d 1375, 1378 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2016).  Based on that elevated level of prejudice, the Court will be unable to
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declare beyond a reasonable doubt the district court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial
did not contribute the verdict. See Watkins, 152 Idaho at 766.
The State argues Z.B.’s response “is just as easily interpreted as the interview
touching on whether [Mr.]  Davis  was  a  registered  sex  offender.  .  .  .    That  the  police
investigation of [Mr.] Davis included interviewing Z.B. ‘[a]bout registered sex offender’
did not establish that [Mr.] Davis was a registered sex offender any more than evidence
the police interviewed Z.B. about child pornography established that [Mr.] Davis was in
possession of child pornography.”  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  This argument fails because it
presupposes that Mr. Davis’ status as a registered sex offender was somehow an open
question, as opposed to a highly prejudicial fact subject to a court order precluding its
introduction into evidence.  (See R., pp.468, 470.)
Based on the district court’s observation at the sentencing hearing that the jury
had carefully considered the evidence, the State also argues the denial of a motion for a
mistrial was not so inherently prejudicial as to constitute reversible error because the
jury ultimately convicted Mr. Davis on five of the eleven counts adduced at the sexual
conduct trial, and acquitted him on the other six counts.  (See Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)
However, it is impossible to determine why the jury acquitted Mr. Davis on those six
counts.  Further, even after acquitting Mr. Davis on some of the charges, the jury could
have used the revelation that Mr. Davis was a convicted sex offender to support their
findings of guilt on the five counts of conviction.
Thus, even assuming it is Mr. Davis’ burden to show reversible error, the
prosecutorial misconduct’s continuing impact on the trial indicates that the district court
committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial. See Field,
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144 Idaho at 571-72. The judgment of conviction in the sexual conduct case should be
vacated, and the case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Forty-
Five Years, With Twenty Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Davis Following His Conviction For
Failure To Notify Of Change Of Address Of Sexual Offender Registration
Mr. Davis asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of forty-five years, with twenty years fixed, upon him following his
conviction in the registration case.  The district court incorrectly considered certain
aggravating factors when fashioning the sentence in the registration case, where those
factors were based on the improper convictions from the sexual conduct case.  The
sentence imposed in the registration case should be vacated and the case should be
remanded to the district court for resentencing.
The State, citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996), argues Mr. Davis
“has cited no authority for his argument that it is improper to consider the lewd conduct,
sexual battery, and child pornography convictions.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  In Zichko, the
Idaho Supreme Court held, “[w]hen issues on appeal are not supported by propositions
of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.” Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263.
The Zichko Court also held, “[a] party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority
or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.” Id.
Here, in support of the issue of whether the district court abused its sentencing
discretion in the registration case, Mr. Davis presented authority on the abuse of
discretion standard of review for sentencing issues on appeal (see App. Br., p.20), and
argument on the district court’s incorrect consideration of certain aggravating factors
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where those factors were based on the improper convictions from the sexual conduct
case (see App. Br., pp.20-22).  Thus, Mr. Davis submits he has not waived the issue of
whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence in the
registration case. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263.
The State further contends the law is directly contrary to Mr. Davis’ claim,
because a sentencing court may consider evidence of previously dismissed or unproven
charges.  (See App. Br., p.11 (quoting State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 926 (Ct. App.
1993)).)  However, Mr. Davis’ assertion was not that the district court could not consider
previously dismissed or unproven charges, but that the district court incorrectly
considered certain aggravating factors where those factors were based on the improper
convictions from the sexual conduct case.  (See App. Br., pp.20-22.)  The district court
based its sentence in the registration case on the convictions from the sexual conduct
case.  (See Tr., Nov. 6, 2015, p.37, L.20 – p.39, L.18.)  As explained above in Section I.
and in the Appellant’s Brief, the district court committed reversible error when it denied
Mr. Davis’ motion for a mistrial in the sexual conduct case, and those convictions were
therefore improper.  The district court should not have fashioned its sentence for the
registration case on the basis of those improper convictions.
Because the district court incorrectly considered certain aggravating factors when
fashioning Mr. Davis’ sentence in the registration case, the sentence imposed by the
district court is excessive considering any view of the facts.  The sentence imposed in




For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Davis respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction in the
sexual conduct case and remand the case to the district court for a new trial.  Mr. Davis
also respectfully requests this Court vacate the sentence imposed in the registration
case and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I  HEREBY CERTIFY that  on  this  16th day of March, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JACOB S DAVIS
INMATE #71837
ISCI
PO BOX 14
BOISE ID 83707
SUSAN E WIEBE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
VIRGINIA BOND
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BPM/eas
